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 Abstract 
In an age where information is plentiful and access to it is practically unlimited, the veracity of 
information is frequently an afterthought. Previous research has demonstrated that individuals 
may often be reluctant to alter their beliefs and attitudes even after false information is corrected. 
This phenomenon is known as the continued-influence effect or the continued influence of 
misinformation (CIM). Misinformation and “fake news” have grown more common, and their 
effectiveness may be explained by CIM. Research also shows that schemas can have significant 
effects on how information is processed, and preexisting beliefs, values and attitudes can affect 
what information is readily absorbed, ignored, forgotten or invented. Individuals with more 
extreme partisan schemas, particularly conservatives, may be more vulnerable to misinformation. 
The current study was an examination of CIM in college students and the general population 
who were exposed to fake news, corrections of fake news, or both. The hypotheses that attitudes 
about initial misinformation and degree of belief change upon correction would vary by partisan 
schema strength were partially supported. 




   
 
Elephants Never Forget: Partisan Schemas and the Continued Influence of Misinformation 
People must process an overwhelming amount of information on a daily basis, and 
verifying the credibility or relevance of information is often an afterthought. Mitchell et al. 
(2018) found that only about a third of U.S. adults were able to correctly identify a set of news 
headlines as facts or opinions, and were less accurate if the headlines were aligned with their 
own political ideology; for many, judgments of the accuracy and truthfulness of news depended 
on how much they agreed with it. Despite this, there is a growing awareness of the prevalence of 
misinformation, more commonly known as “fake news.”  
Approximately half of Americans currently consider misinformation a “very big 
problem” today, and 68% agree that it has eroded trust in the U.S. political system (Mitchell et 
al., 2019). For example, in a 2020 survey, most Americans (71%) reported that they were 
familiar with a conspiracy theory that claims that the COVID-19 pandemic was planned or 
intentional (Mitchell et al., 2020). However, partisanship was predictive of whether or not an 
individual actually believed in the COVID-19 conspiracy theory: 34% of Republicans stated that 
the theory was “probably or definitely” true compared to only 18% of Democrats, and this 
occurred despite little difference in how likely both groups were to be familiar with the claim. 
Republicans (63%) were also more likely than Democrats (18%) to say that the pandemic has 
been exaggerated (Mitchell et al., 2020). In another study, Americans reported that they still 
believe in a conspiracy theory stating that former U.S. president Barack Obama was born outside 
the U.S., and those beliefs also fell along partisan lines: 38% of self-described “very strong” 
Republicans believed the conspiracy theory compared to only 11% of “very strong” Democrats 
(Jardina & Traugott, 2019). Regardless of efforts to debunk and correct it, misinformation (such 
as conspiracy theories) has been shown to influence beliefs and reasoning, and research suggests 
 
   
 
that prior experience and knowledge, or schemas, may play a role in the effectiveness of both the 
initial misinformation and the corrections. 
The perseverance of false beliefs as a result of fake news demonstrates a phenomenon 
known as the continued-influence effect, or the continued influence of misinformation (CIM), 
which describes how the reconstructive processes of memory can decrease the likelihood that 
beliefs will be updated after correction or retraction of the original misinformation (Anderson et 
al., 1980; H. M. Johnson & Seifert, 1994; McFarland et al., 2007; Ross et al., 1975). Perception 
and memory are generally understood to be constructions, not copies, of experiences. Research 
suggests these constructions are influenced by situational and dispositional factors that impact 
both the ability to process information (e.g. capacity limits) and the motivation to do so (e.g. 
interest or involvement). As a result, human memory is rife with errors of various consequence, 
colored by assumptions and inferences, mingled with traces of the original events or details 
(Roediger & DeSoto, 2015). Bartlett (1932) argued that perceiving, comprehending and 
remembering are a function of an individual’s schemas for understanding of the world. Schemas 
include stereotypes, and those related to strong political and social beliefs have been shown to 
exert considerable influence over processing of misinformation (Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985; 
Bronstein et al., 2019; Greenstein & Franklin, 2020; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; Walter et al., 2020). 
Therefore, in a polarized political environment awash with misinformation, schematic processing 
may directly impact the perceiver’s ability to determine the veracity of information and 
subsequent correction, particularly for individuals with extreme partisan schemas. 
Schemas 
Schemas are generally considered functional, adaptive and efficient (Bargh, 1982); they 
are representations of past experience that become theories about reality and new experiences 
 
   
 
(Bartlett, 1932; Markus & Zajonc, 1985). As organizations of preexisting knowledge and 
memories, schemas include concrete matters (e.g. places, objects, people) and the abstract (e.g. 
beliefs, relationships, attitudes) (Baldwin, 1992; Brewer & Nakamura, 1984; Brewer & Treyens, 
1981; Judd & Kulik, 1980). A schema helps to reduce cognitive load by fitting new information 
into existing concepts rather than having to start from scratch to understand new things, such as 
how to navigate a social situation or the purpose of a novel object. For example, if one were 
dressing for work, the jeans and motorcycle jacket would be ignored; attention would be directed 
toward the schema-appropriate selection of collared shirts. Similarly, a new pair of jeans would 
not be mistaken as office appropriate, and with little complex thought a rental car can be driven 
the familiar route to the office. Schemas work quite well for routine tasks and everyday 
information processing, and they allow perceivers to preserve precious cognitive resources for 
more complex problems. Therefore, information that is schema-consistent would generally be 
easier to process than information that is schema-inconsistent. Given that most of our 
information processing is fairly trivial, schematic thinking tends to be the rule rather than the 
exception (see Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) and the costs are quite modest in comparison to the 
energy-saving benefits. In essence, a schema is both a framework for organizing existing 
information one already has and for how to interpret new information. As Bartlett himself put it, 
“The influence of 'schemata' is influence by the past” and he argued that memory is not divorced 
from context (1932). 
A long history of research suggests that preexisting beliefs, attitudes and values in the 
form of schemas influence the likelihood of scrutinizing incoming information, which is 
selectively encoded and organized according to thematic structures. This is often referred to as 
the consistency bias; attitude-relevant information is more easily processed and recalled, new 
 
   
 
information and experiences tend to be assimilated into existing schemas, and conflicting, 
ambiguous or confusing information is later remembered as having been more in line with the 
individual’s preexisting schema (Bergman & Roediger, 1999; Gawronski, 2012). Judd and Kulik 
(1980) asked participants to rate how much they agreed or disagreed with varying statements 
about contentious social issues (e.g. capital punishment, women’s rights, and majority rule in 
South Africa), to rate how pro/anti each statement was for the social issue, and they were asked 
to recall the statements the next day. Participants responded more quickly, and recalled 
statements more accurately, when they had previously agreed/disagreed more strongly; 
statements that participants responded to more moderately were more difficult to remember later. 
The authors argued that attitudes, as social schemas, drive expectations about the type of 
information that is likely to be encountered and that, particularly for bipolar issues, people expect 
to encounter very agreeable or quite disagreeable information, which facilitates the encoding and 
retention of information that is either highly schema-consistent or highly contradictory. In 
another example, study participants in a graduate student’s office recalled the presence of objects 
consistent with existing schemas for a university office (e.g. books) even if those objects were 
not present (Brewer & Treyens, 1981). Information that is inconsistent with an individual’s 
existing schemas is more likely to be forgotten or ignored, while information that is consistent is 
recalled with relative ease and becomes salient in decision-making (Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985; 
Tuckey & Brewer, 2003). Schemas are vital in what individuals pay attention to, how the 
information is processed, what is ultimately learned, and the constructive nature of recall. Of 
particular interest for the current study is how schemas likely contribute to the processing and 
retention of misinformation after correction. 
  
 
   
 
Schema Theory and the Continued Influence of Misinformation 
The continued influence of misinformation (CIM) tends to be explained as an artifact of 
the way memory and memory organization (schemas) are broadly understood to work. 
Information in the form of an “engram,” or memory trace, is processed and encoded into 
semantic long-term memory, where it is stored for later inclusion in a reconstructive process 
(Baddeley, 1966; Bartlett, 1932; Dudai, 2004; Goldstein, 2014; Hemmer & Steyvers, 2009). 
Details may be recalled correctly but misattributed to another familiar or commonly referenced 
source, or schema-related knowledge may be used to fill knowledge gaps, resulting in flawed but 
stable memories rich with plausible elements that contribute to the recaller’s confidence (Kleider 
et al., 2008). In a similar way, corrections and new learning become associated and intertwined 
with the initial misinformation. Misinformation is not simply unlearned or removed from 
memory; it continues to contribute and interfere in a variety of ways (Ayers & Reder, 1998). 
Alternatively, corrections of previous information may become an addendum that “tags” the 
initial misinformation with a negation, which may be lost over time or overlooked under stress or 
time constraints (H. M. Johnson & Seifert, 1998).  
Factors related to the information itself also appear to influence CIM. For example, much 
past research suggests that misinformation that is causal (i.e. explains events, such as “the 
building caught on fire because of improperly stored gasoline”) results in greater CIM, and that 
effective corrections must be both plausible and causal in nature (H. M. Johnson & Seifert, 1994; 
Rapp & Kendeou, 2007; Schul & Mazursky, 1990; Seifert, 2002). In other words, corrective 
messages should have as much explanatory power as the misinformation in order to be effective. 
Ecker et al. (2011) applied varying strengths of encoding for misinformation and then tested the 
effectiveness of retractions; both strong and weak memory encoding resulted in CIM. While a 
 
   
 
strong retraction reduced memory strength for misinformation, no amount of retraction 
eliminated CIM completely. The results supported previous findings that even weakly encoded 
misinformation was resistant to retraction (Schul & Mazursky, 1990).   
Evidence suggests that schema-consistent information is perceived and recalled easily 
and quickly, a process referred to as fluency, which likely contributes to CIM. As experience or 
information becomes routine, it becomes schematic. Thus, information that has been encountered 
frequently becomes schematic and is more likely to be considered factual or accurate later, even 
if the individual was made aware that it was false (Pennycook et al., 2018). In one study of this 
“illusory truth effect,” DiFonzo et al. (2016) found that repetitive exposure to rumors impacted 
the validity judgements of the rumors. Processing fluency, or the relative ease with which 
participants could process statements due to familiarity, mediated the validity judgements, 
suggesting that familiarity played a role in susceptibility to rumor acceptance. Pennycook et al. 
(2018) found that even relatively implausible headlines from (actual) fake news articles shared 
online were judged as more accurate after only a single previous exposure (although extremely 
implausible statements such as “Smoking cigarettes is good for your lungs” were unconvincing). 
The familiarity effect occurred despite warnings that the headline was disputed or contested by 
fact-checkers. The authors suggest that such disclaimers are likely ineffective weapons against 
misinformation because relatively little exposure to plausible statements is necessary to increase 
perceived accuracy of information. Fazio et al. (2015) also found that prior knowledge was not 
particularly effective at preventing illusory truth effects, which demonstrated a “knowledge 
neglect” in favor of processing fluency. In short, many factors influence memory encoding, 
recall and ultimately CIM, particularly prior experience and familiarity, suggesting that schemas 
may be a significant factor in misinformation and correction.  
 
   
 
Personal Schemas and Misinformation  
Schemas and their components may be particularly influential in the memory for, and 
resilience to, misinformation, under conditions that reduce the likelihood of analytical thinking. 
In one study, Pennycook and Rand (2019), found that those with higher scores on the Cognitive 
Reflection Test, a measure of likelihood to engage in analytical thinking, were better able to 
discern fake news and real news, even if the headlines did not match the participants’ own 
political ideology. Those with lower scores were less likely to pick the false or true headlines 
apart. Other studies found similar effects (De keersmaecker & Roets, 2017; Zhu et al., 2010). In 
one study of misinformation during political campaigns, Murphy et al. (2019) demonstrated that 
false memories relevant to issue-based voting could be experimentally manipulated, particularly 
among those who scored lower in analytical thinking. The study used either real or fake news 
about scandals on either side of Ireland’s abortion referendum campaign, and asked participants 
if they remembered the events. Those in favor of the referendum to repeal an abortion ban were 
more likely to “remember” a fake news scandal for the opposing campaign; those opposed to the 
repeal were more likely to recall a fabricated scandal for those in favor. The effect was stronger 
for participants who scored low on a measure of cognitive ability.  
The tendency to favor schematic processing over analytical thinking has also been linked 
to individual difference variables such as fear of negative evaluation, harm avoidance, and 
cooperativeness, characteristics that Zhu et al. (2010) found were predictive of a vulnerability to 
misinformation. Bronstein et al. (2019) found that traits such as dogmatism, delusionality, and 
religious fundamentalism were positively related to belief in fake (but not true) news, and the 
authors noted that the traits also shared a common link with reduced propensity for analytic 
thinking. Individual differences in sociopolitical views have been connected to schema-based 
 
   
 
processing. A long history of research suggests that value-relevant attitudes, especially political 
or social ones, are among the strongest (Johnson & Eagly, 1989), and strongly held and value-
laden attitudes serve to maximize processing of information that matches attitudes and to 
exaggerate the dissimilarity of information that is in contrast, as in schemas (Sherif & Hovland, 
1961). Schemas impact how a person responds to information, and partisan schemas representing 
strong political and social beliefs may be particularly salient in processing information relevant 
to these schemas, often the subject of both real and fake news. 
The Influence of Partisan Schemas 
Schemas encompass an individual’s worldview, including their political and social 
beliefs, values and attitudes, and political bias has been linked to differences in information 
processing (Dodd et al., 2012, 2016; Jost et al., 2003). Research suggests that partisan political 
attitudes are among the strongest of convictions and they predict intolerance of opposing beliefs 
(van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2017). In addition, those with stronger partisan schemas more readily 
learn and accept information that supports those beliefs, and are more likely to ignore corrections 
that contradict their political views; partisanship affects both learning and memory (Johnson & 
Eagly, 1989; Khanna & Sood, 2018; Taber & Lodge, 2006). For example, in three studies, 
Nyhan and Reifler (2010) found that the effect of corrections was conditional on the strength of 
preexisting attitudes; corrective information was most successful when it aligned with strongly 
held partisan beliefs, and was the least successful when the correction was counter-attitudinal. 
These effects were particularly robust among U.S. conservatives. Researchers have offered 
several explanations for such partisan differences in information processing. Some have found a 
connection between conservative schemas and disinterest in novel stimuli (Carraro et al., 2011; 
Dodd et al., 2012; Shook & Fazio, 2009), low tolerance for uncertainty, and a high need for 
 
   
 
closure (Jost et al., 2003). In short, many of the traits associated with misinformation 
vulnerability (e.g. dogmatism, religious fundamentalism, etc.; Bronstein et al., 2019) may be 
more common to those with strong conservative political bias (Jost et al., 2003).  
Axt et al. (2020) found that simply calling information “fake news” often appeals to 
conservative political schemas. The researchers conducted several experiments in order to better 
understand what draws people to make fake news attributions. Participants read about errors 
made in reporting the news that either matched their political beliefs or were schema-
inconsistent, and then indicated how much they believed the error was due to intentional 
deception or incompetence. Results suggested that the fake news label appealed to the 
conservative participants; it satisfied a need for structure and certainty, and a tendency to 
attribute mistakes in the news to a more purposeful reason (i.e. intentional deception) rather than 
simple errors in reporting. In other words, it may be easier to imagine news organizations 
conspiring to release fake news for malicious ends that are predictable and concrete, rather than 
complex reasons that are difficult to pin down or solve. Both increased tendency to make fake 
news attributions, and vulnerability to fake news itself, are related to partisanship. 
Because schemas exert influence over what individuals learn and remember, those with 
strong schemas likely seek out and more readily learn information (e.g. real or fake news) that is 
consistent with their schemas, while ignoring or rejecting information that is not. Due to the 
strength of political beliefs and associated values, misinformation that appeals to preexisting 
schemas about the nature of political figures may be particularly effective on strong partisan 
schemas. In particular, CIM may have a more powerful effect on those with strong conservative 
schemas who are motivated to manage the threats of uncertainty and complexity (Jost et al., 
2003). 
 
   
 
Current Studies 
The above literature review suggests that message content and delivery, as well as 
individual differences in the form of political beliefs and schemas, may make people 
differentially vulnerable to misinformation by promoting the use of mental shortcuts, decrease 
the likelihood of analytical thinking, impair memory, and thus increase CIM, particularly for 
conservative political schemas. The current studies were designed to respond to calls for further 
research on the relationship between CIM and preexisting attitudes and beliefs (Ecker et al., 
2014), particularly in relationship to political orientation (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). Our 
hypotheses were that participants who identified as strongly partisan would 1) be less critical of 
misinformation that was schema-consistent, 2) be less resistant to a correction that was schema-
consistent, 3) be more critical of misinformation that was schema-inconsistent, and 4) be more 





 Participants were recruited from the Bridgewater State University SONA subject pool, 
which is comprised primarily of students enrolled in the Introduction to Psychology course in 
order to earn course credit. There were 287 participants (94 males, 181 females, and 12 who 
indicated other or did not specify; Mage = 18.62). In terms of ethnicity, participants primarily 
identified as Caucasian/White (72.8%), followed by African American/Black (10.5%), 
Latino/Hispanic (7%), Asian/Pacific Islander (1.4%), and other (3.8%), and some did not 
 
   
 
respond (4.5%). There were 103 participants that identified as Democrat, 42 that identified as 
Republican, and 110 that identified with no party. 
Measures 
 The dependent variable, the continued influence of misinformation, was measured by the 
Likert scale ratings of the target on 15 different attributes (e.g. “intelligent,” “responsible;” see 
Appendix A). Participants also responded to several attitude measures. The variable of particular 
interest was political orientation. We included a single item that asked which political party the 
participant identified with (Republican, Democrat, or no party) and one question that asked 
participants to rate their self-identified political leaning on a 0-7 scale from extremely liberal to 
extremely conservative. We also included the Political Belief Scale (PBS; Webber et al., 2018), 
which was designed to study extremist beliefs. Participants rated their agreement with a series of 
statements that represent liberal, moderate, and conservative policies and values (liberal α = .77; 
moderate α = .66; conservative α = .83, as reported by Webber et al., 2018a). Participants also 
completed the Social-Dominance Orientation Scale (Pratto et al., 2011), which is designed to 
capture beliefs in societal group hierarchies and generalized prejudice (α = 83, as reported by 
Pratto et al., 1994). Scale reliability results for all studies are reported in Table 1. 
Procedure 
The project was IRB approved and data collection was completed during the Fall of 
2019. Participants entered the lab and were instructed to sit at a computer with a packet and 
pencil in front of them, and after signing the informed consent document, they could begin 
completing the packet. At certain points in the packet, they were prompted to advance a 
slideshow on the computer in front of them. The slide directed the participant to click on links to 
actual websites which varied based on condition. This way, the articles appeared in a realistic 
 
   
 
manner, and the effect of misinformation and efficacy of corrective news reports increased the 
external validity of the study.  
The fake news article was hosted on a “satire” news website called Taters Gonna Tate 
(www.tatersgonnatate.com, now defunct; article archived at http://archive.is/W5iHx), and 
claimed that Democrat House Representative Rashida Tlaib committed election fraud and was 
under investigation. While the article makes this claim repeatedly, it also contradicts itself 
several times, and the article is posted under the category of “Satire and/or Conservative Fan 
Fiction,” making it possible for an astute reader to determine that the article is misinformation 
and the source is unreliable. The correction article was posted on the reputable fact-checking 
website Snopes (https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/rashida-tlaib-investigation/). The Snopes 
article explicitly corrected the exact article posted to Taters Gonna Tate, accurately reporting that 
the original story was a “complete fabrication,” on a network of websites “infamous for 
generating politically inflammatory misinformation under the guise of proffering ‘satire,’” and 
suggesting that some misinformation is originally distributed in this manner (Mikkelson, 2019).  
The study was originally designed with six conditions total (3x2). In C1, participants read 
the fake news article online with negative misinformation about the politician (Rashida Tlaib), 
and the correction. Participants completed the individual differences scales between reading the 
fake news article and the correction. In C2, participants read the correction only. In C3, 
participants read the fake news article only. Participants completed all parts of the packet and 
were debriefed and dismissed. The corresponding experimental conditions in which the target 




   
 
Results 
A mean target rating was calculated by aggregating the 15 attributes. There were no 
significant differences between the ratings of the target of fake news in C1 (M = 2.59) and C3 (M 
= 2.44) (p = .27). Additionally, participant ratings of the target of the correction article in C1 (M 
= 3.19) and C2 (M = 3.33) were not significantly different (p = .35). 
To test the hypotheses regarding CIM, the C1 pre-correction ratings were subtracted from 
the post-correction ratings to create a measure of rating change. For those who identified as 
Democrat, Mchange = 0.84; for those who identified as Republican, Mchange = -0.01; and for those 
who identified with no party, Mchange = 0.63. A one-way ANOVA revealed significant 
differences between the means for Republicans and Democrats (p = .03), Republicans and no 
party (p = .03), but not between Democrats and no party (F(2,63) = 4.16, p = .37). Republican 
participants updated their beliefs significantly less than Democrats and no party participants.  
Conservative leaning (on the single-item Likert scale) predicted more critical evaluations 
of the target overall: fake news r(136) = -.17, p = .05; correction r(124) = -.42, p < .01. However, 
the correlation between self-identified political leaning and rating change did not quite reach 
significance, r(64) = -.22, p = .08. Table 2 shows the results of correlations between scores on 
the PBS, Social Dominance Orientation, and evaluations pre-correction, post-correction, and 
rating change. Agreement with liberal statements on the PBS was significantly positively 
correlated with evaluation of target before and after correction, but not with rating change. 
Conservatism scores from the PBS were significantly negatively correlated with evaluation of 
target after correction, but not with rating change. Moderate scores from the PBS were 
significantly positively correlated with evaluation of target after correction and with rating 
change (see Table 2), but had low reliability (see Table 1). 
 
   
 
Discussion 
The difference in the rating change between participants who identified as Republican 
versus those that identified as Democrat or with no political party supported the hypothesis that 
strong partisan schemas may influence CIM. Politically right-leaning participants updated their 
beliefs about the Democrat target much less than politically left-leaning or neutral participants, 
as expected.  
The correlations indicated that participants’ pre-existing left or right-leaning political 
beliefs were more strongly related to overall evaluations of the target than to rating change. 
While moderate political beliefs were positively correlated with rating change, it is difficult to 
interpret directionality. It may be that those high in moderate political beliefs updated their 
beliefs to a greater degree, or that those low in moderate political beliefs updated their beliefs to 
a lesser degree, or both.  
Limitations 
Overall, there was less evidence of CIM than in previous research; participants tended to 
update their beliefs upon correction. This may be due to the relatively short duration between 
receiving the misinformation and the correction, or because there was not significant power; 
there were relatively few participants in C1 who identified with the Republican party or 
otherwise expressed conservative leanings. Moderate scores on the PBS were relatively low in 
reliability and were excluded from further analysis in Study 2 and Study 3. 
A Republican target news article and associated survey was planned to be completed in 
the Spring of 2020, however, the COVID-19 outbreak disrupted data collection after fewer than 
50 students participated. Instead, a follow-up study was conducted to repeat the experiment with 
all conditions present in a fully online format. This was to ensure that slight differences in 
 
   
 
methods, or political beliefs shifting due to the pandemic itself, were not significant factors in 
any resulting differences.  
Additionally, Study 1 used actual fake news articles and corrections posted online to real 
websites. However, finding equivalent fake news articles and corrections across all target 
conditions was determined to be prohibitively difficult. Instead, Study 2 used a template derived 
from an actual news article, and an original correction template designed by the researchers. This 
allowed for greater internal validity across conditions by ensuring that the article was very 




Participants were once more recruited from the Bridgewater State University SONA 
subject pool, which is comprised primarily of students enrolled in the Introduction to Psychology 
course. They volunteered in order to earn course credit. There were 297 participants total 
comprised of 76 males, 218 females, and 3 who specified non-binary or bigender (Mage = 19.54). 
In terms of ethnicity, participants could select more than one category, and the most frequently 
chosen category was Caucasian/White (75.8%), followed by African American/Black (12.8%), 
Latino/Hispanic (7.1%), Asian/Pacific Islander (3.4%), Native American/American Indian 
(1.7%), and other/non-specified (4.4%), and some chose not respond (1.3%). There were 165 
participants that identified as Democrat, 35 that identified as Republican, and 97 that identified 
as no party. 
  
 
   
 
Measures 
The dependent variable was similar to Study 1, with a slight change to more closely align 
statements with Stereotype Content Model (SCM) dimensions of competence and warmth: we 
removed an item that asked how “favorable” the article target is because nothing similar is 
included in the SCM scale (see Appendix A). The Stereotype Content Model (Fiske et al., 2002) 
has been used to describe racial and ethnic stereotypes along dimensions of competence and 
warmth (competence α = .94; warmth α = .90 as reported by Fiske et al., 2002). Study 2 also 
included the Intellectual Humility Scale (IH; Alfano et al., 2018), which has four subscales 
supported by five confirmatory factor analyses and validity studies (convergent and divergent 
with self-reported and informant personality and behavior) in two languages (Alfano et al., 
2017). Previous research found that intellectual humility is related to tolerance of opposing 
views, despite the strength of an individual’s own partisan bias (Porter & Schumann, 2018), and 
we sought to explore how this might be related to CIM. Scale reliability results for all studies are 
reported in Table 1. 
Procedure 
Participants were asked to complete a survey hosted on Qualtrics and distributed online 
via SONA, and were allowed to complete the survey at a time of their choosing. They were 
randomly assigned to one of six possible conditions: Democrat fake news and correction (C1), 
Republican fake news and correction (C2), neutral fake news and correction (C3), Democrat 
correction only (C4), Republican correction only (C5) or neutral correction only (C6). The fake 
news articles were fabrications designed by the researchers for the study. The material was based 
on a United States Department of Justice website article about a bookkeeper charged with 
embezzlement from their company (see: https://www.justice.gov/usao-edpa/pr/philadelphia-
 
   
 
bookkeeper-convicted-embezzling-almost-16-million-former-employer). All names and 
references to the company in the article were changed to refer to either Democrat House Rep. 
Adam Schiff (C1/C4), Republican House Rep. Jim Jordan (C2/C5), or Starbucks CEO Kevin 
Johnson (C3/C6), and appropriate organizations for each figure (see Appendix B). Schiff and 
Jordan were selected as they were in equivalent positions within politics and somewhat known 
outside of their respective states; Johnson was selected as the neutral target due to his association 
with a familiar company, and neither he nor Starbucks have well-known or clear political 
affiliations. Participants were told that the article had appeared on social media recently and was 
shared from worldnewsdailyreport.com, a website which describes itself as “satire” and its 
articles are routinely posted online as fake news. The corrections were framed as also having 
been shared on social media, but from www.snopes.com, and were an explicit correction of the 
fake news article. The corrections detailed the origin of the fake article and stated that no part of 
it was true, and that the website it came from is known for other fake news articles (see 
Appendix C). As in the previous study, between viewing the fake news and correction, or before 
viewing the correction, participants completed scales including the PBS, the Social Dominance 
Orientation Scale, and the Intellectual Humility scale. Afterwards, participants received credit for 
completing the study and were dismissed. 
Results 
Warmth and competence ratings were calculated for each target. A multivariate analysis 
of variance of final target ratings indicated there were no main effects for target or participant 
political party, condition, and no significant interactions. Regardless of participant or target 
political party, evaluations of the target after correction were close to, but not significantly 
different from, those who only saw the correction article. To test the hypotheses about CIM, the 
 
   
 
pre-correction ratings were subtracted from the post-correction ratings to measure rating change 
in warmth and competence. Figure 1 shows pre and post ratings by participants who identified as 
Democrats, Figure 2 shows ratings by Republicans, and Figure 3 shows ratings by participants 
who endorsed no party. In these figures, Republicans appeared to update their competence and 
warmth ratings for Democrat targets the least. However, analysis of variance by target political 
party (Democrat, Republican or neutral) and participant political party did not reveal statistically 
significant main effects or interactions. Participant political party (Democrat, Republican or 
neutral) and target political party (Democrat, Republican or neutral) did not significantly 
influence change in warmth and competence ratings (all p > .05). Low power likely impacted the 
ability to find significant differences between groups. Because there were so few Republican 
respondents, several experimental groups had fewer than 10 participants. 
Correlational results suggested partial support for hypotheses 1 and 3 about partisan 
schemas and target evaluation overall. Social dominance orientation was significantly negatively 
correlated with final evaluations of competence (r(294) = -.15, p = .01) and warmth (r(294) = -
.12, p = .04), while the open-mindedness (r(294) = .16, p = .01) and engagement (r(294) = .12, p 
= .04) from intellectual humility predicted more positive final competence evaluations.  
Correlational results also suggested support for the hypotheses 2 and 4 regarding CIM and 
partisan beliefs. Agreement with conservative statements on the PBS was significantly 
negatively correlated with competence rating change (r(172) = -.20, p < .01) and warmth rating 
change (r(172) = -.24, p < .01) across all targets. Rating change was also negatively correlated 
with social dominance orientation (r(172) = -.26, p < .01 for competence, and r(172) = -.25, p < 
.01 for change in warmth ratings). There were also significant correlations between total 
Intellectual Humility scale scores and both competence rating change (r(172) = .17, p = .03) and 
 
   
 
warmth rating change (r(172) = .16, p = .04). Individual Intellectual Humility subscales were 
correlated with rating change depending on the target’s political affiliation (see Table 3 for more 
detailed results).  
Discussion 
ANOVA results failed to support the hypothesis that participants would update their 
beliefs differentially based on their own partisan schemas and the political affiliation of the target 
about which they received misinformation and correction, likely because of low power. Trends 
indicated that Democrats, Republicans and no party participants may update their beliefs upon 
correction to varying degrees based on the target’s political affiliation. Democrats tended to 
update for Democrat or neutral targets, and Republicans seemed to update less overall. Figure 2 
shows what appears to be a clear difference by participants who identified as Republican in how 
they update their competence and warmth ratings upon correction of fake news. Indeed, they 
indicated a similar level of warmth but much higher competence for the Republican target before 
the correction than for the Democrat target after correction. Republican participants also updated 
their ratings the most for a Republican target. While separating by target did not reveal 
statistically significant differences, the trends indicated that further research is warranted; 
partisan schemas may have affected how participants responded to targets from different parties.  
Correlational analyses indicated that final evaluations of targets’ competence and warmth 
were associated with SDO, lending partial support for hypotheses 1 and 3. IH subscales for open-
mindedness and engagement were associated with evaluations of target competence. Intellectual 
humility has been linked to tolerance of opposing views and political views in particular, which 
may impact CIM. Porter and Schumann (2018) found that despite holding political beliefs of 
similar strength, those higher in intellectual humility were still more tolerant of opposing 
 
   
 
political views than those lower in intellectual humility. Therefore, we suggest that those with 
greater intellectual humility may be more likely to update their beliefs upon correction as well. 
However, the correlations were fairly weak despite statistical significance. The correlation 
results indicated stronger support for hypotheses 2 and 4 regarding CIM: there were significant 
negative correlations between PBS conservatism scores and rating change for competence and 
warmth. In other words, the more conservative a participant was, the less they changed their 
ratings of targets on correction. The effect of conservative schemas appeared to be stronger for 
Democrat and neutral targets. Rating change was also negatively correlated with SDO, indicating 
that extreme partisan beliefs about social hierarchies may affect CIM as well. With regard to 
intellectual humility, it was the Republican and neutral targets who benefitted most. Higher 
intellectual humility predicted somewhat more change for those targets, and intellectual humility 
may be related to how likely one is to update their beliefs upon correction. While we reported 
these results, we consider them to be exploratory in nature and not directly related to our 
hypotheses. 
Liberal views and intellectual humility were linked to a tendency to update beliefs upon 
correction. The results also suggested that the degree to which individuals updated their beliefs 
upon correction varied by target political party. Partisan schemas, particularly conservative ones, 
seemed to impact the effectiveness of correction after exposure to fake news.  
Limitations 
Some trends could not be interpreted because of low power; there were few participants 
who identified as Republican or neutral overall, which rendered very small sample sizes in some 
conditions. The lack of Republican participants was an issue we sought to correct with Study 3 
by using a different recruitment strategy.  
 





Participants were recruited from Prolific, an online subject pool. Recruitment criteria 
were limited to only requiring U.S. nationality. Unlike the previous studies, participants of all 
age groups and backgrounds were recruited. There were 223 participants total comprised of 93 
males, 111 females, 7 who specified non-binary or bigender, and 1 who preferred not to answer 
(Mage = 31.07). In terms of ethnicity, participants could select more than one category, and the 
most frequently chosen category was Caucasian/White (66%) followed by Asian/Pacific Islander 
(15.6%), African American/Black (10.8%), Latino/Hispanic (9.0%), Native American/American 
Indian (1.9%), and other/non-specified (1.4%), and some chose not to respond (0.9%). There 
were 130 participants that identified as Democrat, 27 that identified as Republican, and 55 that 
identified as no party. 
Measures 
The same fake news articles were used. Variables were manipulated and measured in the 
same manner as Study 2. Scale reliability results for all studies are reported in Table 1. 
Procedure 
Participants were asked to complete a survey identical to Study 2, using the same fake 
news articles and corrections from Study 2 (any alterations were made to conform with Prolific 
standards). Afterwards, participants were thanked, received acknowledgement and compensation 




   
 
Results 
Warmth and competence ratings were calculated for each target; means are reported in 
Table 4 for clarity. A multivariate analysis of variance of final target ratings indicated there were 
no main effects for condition or participant political party, or their interaction. However, there 
was a significant main effect for target political party (F(4, 364) = 4.35, p < .01). The univariate 
test indicated that the effect for target was driven by higher mean ratings for the Democrat (0.40) 
and Neutral (0.57) targets’ competence in comparison with the Republican (-0.17), F(2, 184) = 
6.39, p < .01. Warmth ratings did not differ (MDem = -.11, MNeutral = -.09 and MRepub -.33; F(2, 
184) = .99, p = .37). There was also a significant interaction between target and participant 
political party (F(8, 364) = 2.17, p = .03). Republican participants rated the Republican target 
significantly higher in competence (M = 0.46) than either Democrats (M = -0.41) or no party (M 
= -0.20). Competence ratings for the other targets did not differ. Republican participants also 
rated the Republican target significantly higher in warmth (M = 0.33) than either Democrats (M 
= -0.83) or those affiliated with neither party (M = -0.59). Warmth ratings for the other targets 
did not differ.   
Figure 4 shows pre and post ratings by participants who identified as Democrats, Figure 5 
shows ratings by Republicans, and Figure 6 shows ratings by participants who endorsed no party. 
Figure 7 shows mean ratings of targets post correction by participant political party and target 
political party. 
As in Study 2, the pre-correction ratings were subtracted from the post-correction ratings 
to measure rating change in warmth and competence. Analysis of variance by target political 
party (Democrat, Republican or neutral) and participant political party did not reveal significant 
main effects or interactions. Participant political party (Democrat, Republican or neutral) and 
 
   
 
target affiliation (Democrat, Republican or neutral) did not significantly influence change in 
warmth and competence ratings (all p > .05). While Figure 5 suggests that Republican 
participants failed to update their competence and warmth ratings for Democrats, we cannot 
conclude that there was an effect. As in Study 2, low power likely impacted the ability to find 
significant differences between groups. Because there were so few Republican respondents, 
several experimental groups had fewer than 10 participants.  
Correlational analysis indicated differences by target political party. When the target was 
a Democrat, there was a negative correlation between PBS conservatism and competence rating 
(r(65) = -.24, p = .048), and a positive correlation between PBS liberalism and warmth rating 
(r(65) = .30, p = .013). There was also a negative correlation between SDO and competence 
rating for the Democrat target (r(65) = -.27, p = .029). For a Republican target, PBS 
conservatism was positively correlated with both competence rating (r(63) = .36, p = .003) and 
warmth rating (r(63) = .33, p = .007). Additionally, there were positive correlations between self-
identified political leaning and competence rating (r(63) = .44, p < .000) and warmth rating 
(r(63) = .32, p = .009). For the neutral target, there was only a positive correlation between self-
identified political leaning and warmth rating (r(68) = .24, p = .043). Intellectual Humility 
subscales were differentially correlated with rating change depending on the target’s political 
affiliation as well (see Table 5 for more detailed results). 
Discussion 
Results partially supported hypotheses 1 and 3. Participants rated targets differently on 
competence based on the target’s political affiliation, and this effect was driven mainly by much 
lower ratings for the Republican target when compared to Democrat and neutral targets. This 
was unsurprising as there were many more Democrat or no party participants than Republican. 
 
   
 
Indeed, Republican participants rated the Republican target much higher on competence and 
warmth, but rated Democrat and neutral targets similarly low on both.  
As depicted in Figure 7, Democrat and no party participants rated targets similarly, while 
Republican ratings for the Republican target were significantly different. Similar to Study 2, 
Republican participants did appear to update their beliefs less than Democrat or no party (see 
Figures 4, 5 and 6), but the results were not statistically significant, thus hypotheses 2 and 4 were 
not fully supported, but the non-significant pattern from Study 2 was replicated.  
Correlations between PBS scores and competence and warmth varied considerably by 
target political party and provided some support for all hypotheses. When the target was a 
liberal, attitudes predicted more positive final evaluations of warmth, while conservative 
attitudes were linked to negative final evaluations of the target’s competence. When the target 
was a Republican, liberalism did not predict final scores for competence or warmth, however, 
conservatism predicted more positive final ratings on both dimensions. Correlations between the 
Intellectual Humility Scale and target ratings of competence and warmth were also differentially 
significant based on the target’s political party. Several subscales were significantly associated 
with competence for a Democrat target, but other subscales were significantly associated with 
warmth for a Republican target. While Intellectual Humility Scale results were exploratory in 
nature not directly related to a hypothesis, they may be an interesting direction for future 
research.  
Limitations 
As in Study 1 and Study 2, there were few participants who expressed conservative 
beliefs or identified with the Republican party, resulting in low power. While we hoped to recruit 
more Republican participants by using a public recruitment platform, the sample was not 
 
   
 
sufficiently politically diverse, and we were unable to recruit enough participants overall due to 
cost. Follow-up research will focus on greater numbers of participants for each condition, or 
change recruitment strategies to target specific political groups. 
General Discussion 
Overall, participants did update their beliefs. The magnitude varied by participant and 
target political party and mean target ratings were often vastly different, particularly between 
Democrat and Republican participants, although low power limits the interpretation of the 
patterns. Results suggested that Republican participants updated their ratings the least for targets 
that were Democrat or neutral. In Study 1, Republicans were particularly critical and updated 
their beliefs less when the target was a Democrat, however, data collection was interrupted 
before comparison conditions with Republican or neutral targets could be implemented. We 
sought to correct this issue with Study 2 and Study 3. We also hoped to enroll a greater number 
of Republican or conservative participants. Study 1 took place in-person and in a lab free of 
distractions. Participants were directed to use the computer in front of them to access an actual 
fake news article and related correction posted online. Because of the shortened Spring 2020 
semester, a similar procedure was not possible. Therefore, in Study 2 and Study 3, we changed 
the procedure to embed a fake news article and correction designed for the purpose of the study 
so that it could be similar across all conditions, and to not rely on articles posted online. While 
this decreased external validity, it increased internal validity. 
In Study 2 and Study 3, the images used for the target individuals in both the fake news 
articles and corrections may not have been similar enough, which could have possibly impacted 
results (see Appendix A, B, and C). We felt that it was important to use real images of the targets 
in order to have participants believe that they were reading articles transcribed from elsewhere. 
 
   
 
The images were selected because they were somewhat unflattering or appeared to show the 
targets in a negative or critical light (e.g. surrounded by reporters, expressing anger or 
embarrassment), and portraying subjects unfavorably in this manner is common in fake news. 
However, there are differences between the images that could be confounding factors. For 
example, the image of Adam Schiff shows another well-known politician in the background, 
while the others do not. 
Study 2 revealed a negative correlation between conservatism scores on the PBS and 
rating change for competence and warmth. More conservative participants updated their beliefs 
less than others, and particularly so for Democrat and neutral targets. Participants who scored 
higher in liberalism or intellectual humility updated their beliefs more upon correction. In Study 
3, significant differences were found between participant political party: Republican participants 
rated Democrat and neutral targets much lower than Republican targets. While this is not too 
surprising, Figure 7 shows that Democrat and no party participants responded similarly to all 
targets, while Republicans responded quite differently. In addition, the exploratory use of the 
Intellectual Humility Scale indicated that it may prove to be a useful measure in future research 
on partisan schemas. 
Results may suggest that Republican or conservative participants are less willing to 
update their beliefs, and greater intellectual humility is more common among Democrats or 
liberals which may aid in receiving corrective information. However, care must be taken not to 
overextend these results as if they are monolithic. Indeed, some research suggests that self-
identified conservatives may be more diverse in their political beliefs than are liberals (Feldman 
& Johnston, 2014; Klein & Stern, 2005; Stenner, 2009), and people on the left and right are 
 
   
 
equally likely to employ schemas in judgments, relying more on situational cues to engage in 
acceptable behavior (Crawford, 2012).  
The value of diversity of gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation and more is well-
established, particularly in academia where differing viewpoints and perspectives are vital to 
critical analysis. However, the low turn-out of Republican and conservative participants across 
all studies may represent a different sort of diversity problem in higher education and in the field 
of psychology. Ferguson et al. (2018) found evidence that introductory textbooks in psychology 
contained error and liberal-leaning biases that reflected socio-political homogeneity of the field, 
and argued that the problem may be exacerbated by APA position statements written by 
ideologically invested scholars. When conservative undergraduates enter psychology classes, 
they may feel unwelcome or unwilling to contribute (Duarte et al., 2015). In the psychology 
major, 84% of college professors identify as liberal, and only 8% identify as conservative 
(Rothman et al., 2005), while in the United States as a whole, the ratio of liberals to 
conservatives is roughly 1 to 2 (Saad, 2010). Even if one does not agree with conservative views, 
the absence of conservative viewpoints in academia, and indeed some hostility towards them, 
makes it difficult to examine political beliefs in general or to even discuss them for a better 
understanding.  
Overall, there was certainly a diversity problem both in the university subject pool and on 
Prolific that hinders the ability of the study to be extended to the general population: participants 
overwhelmingly identified as Caucasian/white, liberal and female. The lack of diversity in other 
ways, including Republican or conservative-leaning participants, was an overall limitation of the 
study. For this type of research, the issue could be corrected in the future by specifically recruiting 
Republican participants. Of course, recruiting a larger sample might bring more demographic 
 
   
 
diversity, which can bring viewpoint diversity, but because it was viewpoint diversity that was 
wanted, it may be more effective to pursue it directly.  
Implications 
Many Americans currently believe fake news and misinformation to be a serious issue, 
more so than other issues such as climate change or racial tension (Mitchell et al., 2019). This 
fear seems to be healthy, as fake news has caused a multitude of issues by exploiting how we 
process information, and the systems we use to do so. Falsehoods spread more readily than truth 
online (Vosoughi et al., 2018), people share misinformation unknowingly while acknowledging 
that it confuses dialogue and agreement on basic facts (Barthel et al., 2016), and simply 
repeatedly encountering fake news headlines makes it seem less unethical to share (Effron & 
Raj, 2020). More importantly, encountering the same information repeatedly increases the 
likelihood that an individual will later consider it true, even if they were originally made aware 
that it is false (DiFonzo et al., 2016).  
 For example, 10% of Americans still believe that the risks of vaccines outweigh the 
benefits (Hefferon & Funk, 2020), despite over a decade of efforts to debunk misinformation that 
indicated a link between vaccines and autism (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2020). The prevalence of this belief, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, hints at a 
severe problem. Vaccine skepticism may be enough to cause outbreaks of diseases that would 
otherwise be close to eradication (Hussain et al., 2018), an issue of particular relevance given the 
current pandemic. An unprecedented amount of harm to the credibility of all vaccines was 
accomplished primarily by a single misleading study, one that most adherents to anti-vaccination 
beliefs likely have not read or fully understood (Hussain et al., 2018).  
 
   
 
A growing body of evidence suggests that misinformation has become more frequent and 
more effective among specific audiences largely due to the rise of social media (Del Vicario et 
al., 2016; Guess et al., 2018; Mitchell et al., 2019; Murphy et al., 2019). For example, Luisi 
(2021) found that four out of every ten posts on Facebook about the vaccine for human 
papillomavirus (HPV) were negative, and focused on the supposed risks and threats of the 
vaccine, despite there being little evidence to support these claims. The author suggests that 
misinformation that is negative or amplifies perceived risks spreads more easily online, which 
may help explain the prevalence of it. Many people now receive a majority of their news and 
information through social media platforms and social networks (Hermida et al., 2012; Shearer, 
2018). Despite low expectations regarding accuracy, most Americans obtain at least some of 
their news from social media sources (Shearer & Mitchell, 2021). In addition, while Bergström 
and Belfrage (2018) found that many people consider themselves well-informed consumers of 
news, their behavior indicates a more casual, “incidental” approach to news and information 
consumption. Pennycook et al. (2020) found that many social media users did not consider the 
accuracy of information before sharing it, but would do so if prompted; when asked to rate 
information accuracy before sharing it, participants were more likely to correctly discern whether 
the information was true or false.   
When information is shared via social media, those affiliated with groups often receive 
clusters of messages and belief-supporting material, both verifiable information (e.g. scientific) 
and unverifiable (e.g. conspiracy) (Del Vicario et al., 2016). In this way, groups of individuals 
may be more likely to continue believing in schema-supporting misinformation, which can result 
in homogeneity of information or “echo chambers” that decrease the likelihood of encountering 
opposing views or evidence, and amplify the perceived trustworthiness of misinformation 
 
   
 
(Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Del Vicario et al., 2016). These factors have made misinformation 
very difficult to correct; prior beliefs and schemas may make fact-checking unlikely while 
reducing the effectiveness of corrections.  
We argue here that the strength of misinformation and weakness of corrections or fact-
checking may be traced to the influence of schemas, as suggested by Johnson and Seifert’s 
(1994) original work on the continued influence effect and research on the bipolar schemas 
related to political orientation. Guess et al. (2018) found that, among the over 2500 Americans 
who granted the researchers access to their individual web history, 1 in 4 visited fake news 
websites during the 2016 election cycle. Those who supported Donald Trump for U.S. president 
were particularly likely to visit fake news websites; 58.9% of all visits to fake news websites 
were by 10% of those with the most conservative news diets. Similar to anti-vaccination beliefs, 
negative beliefs about other subjects that have widespread acceptance within the scientific 
community such as anthropogenic climate change, are frequently associated with conservative 
political schemas (Pew Research Center, 2015). In even more recent events, conservatism 
predicted reduced concerns about the threat posed by COVID-19, belief in media exaggeration of 
the threat, and inability to discern real and fake news related to COVID-19 (Calvillo et al., 2020). 
The authors also found that knowledge about and approval of U.S. president Donald Trump 
mediated these effects, suggesting that authority figures that an individual trusts could be helpful 
in communicating corrective information and reducing the impact of misinformation.  
Fake news is often negative or critical and designed to cause strong emotions, which have 
been linked to reliance on schemas in judgments. For example, anger may make individuals rely 
on the perceived credibility of the source rather than the quality of the message (Bodenhausen et 
al., 1994). In a recent experiment by Greenstein and Franklin (2020), participants were more 
 
   
 
vulnerable to schema-consistent misinformation when they were angry, but anger was not related 
to memory errors for true information. Angry participants also made decisions more quickly and 
with increased confidence. Innocuous or mood-neutral misinformation may be less effective 
overall, but it is also possible that anger-inducing misinformation would be more effective in 
prompting reliance on partisan schemas, and we suggest examining this as a potential direction 
for future research. 
Conclusion 
In another study completed at Bridgewater State University (Spievak et al., 2020), 
researchers asked participants to rate the quality and partisan bias of real news sources. 
Participants indicated that news sources congruent with their political beliefs were less biased 
and higher quality, and incongruent sources were more biased and lower quality. Another trend 
emerged, as well: overall, participants considered very few sources to be “news,” instead rating 
them at best, “fair interpretations of the news.” Those who identified as Democrats were more 
likely to rate sources as high quality news, (e.g. NPR and The New York Times, both considered 
by media bias experts to be reliable news sources; see: www.mediabiasfactcheck.com), and they 
rated Fox News as extremely low quality. By contrast, Republicans indicated that almost all 
news sources were low quality and “unfair interpretations of the news,” including Fox News, 
which is typically considered to be largely in agreement with Republican and conservative 
schemas. This trend poses a problem: if those with right-leaning partisan schemas do not 
consider any sources to be news, or even fair interpretations of it, even when it is in agreement 
with their opinions, then perhaps they do not consider any source to be trustworthy. If that is the 
case, then they may regard the truth as a matter of opinion instead. Those who seek out 
 
   
 
information that is schema-consistent and have little interest in the quality of reporting, analysis, 
or evidence, would be similarly uninterested in correction.  
CIM may be more serious than a quirk of human cognition. As attitudes, values and 
beliefs with regard to politics become ever more polarized in the U.S. (Wilson et al., 2020), 
made worse by social media (Bail et al., 2018), and these beliefs may have a substantial impact 




   
 
References 
Alfano, M., Iurino, K., Stey, P., Robinson, B., Christen, M., Yu, F., & Lapsley, D. (2017). 
Development and validation of a multi-dimensional measure of intellectual humility. 
PLOS ONE, 12(8), 1–28. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0182950 
Alfano, M., Iurino, K., Stey, P., Robinson, B., Christen, M., Yu, F., & Lapsley, D. (2018). 
Intellectual humility scale. American Psychological Association. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/t67360-000 
Allcott, H., & Gentzkow, M. (2017). Social media and fake news in the 2016 election. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 31(2), 211–236. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.31.2.211 
Anderson, C. A., Lepper, M. R., & Ross, L. (1980). Perseverance of social theories: The role of 
explanation in the persistence of discredited information. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 39(6), 1037–1049. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0077720 
Axt, J. R., Landau, M. J., & Kay, A. C. (2020). The psychological appeal of fake-news 
attributions. Psychological Science, 31(1), 848–857. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797620922785 
Ayers, M. S., & Reder, L. M. (1998). A theoretical review of the misinformation effect: 
Predictions from an activation-based memory model. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 
5(1), 1–21. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03209454 
Baddeley, A. D. (1966). The influence of acoustic and semantic similarity on long-term memory 
for word sequences. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 18(4), 302–309. 
Bail, C. A., Argyle, L. P., Brown, T. W., Bumpus, J. P., Chen, H., Hunzaker, M. B. F., Lee, J., 
Mann, M., Merhout, F., & Volfovsky, A. (2018). Exposure to opposing views on social 
 
   
 
media can increase political polarization. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 115(37), 9216–9221. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1804840115 
Baldwin, M. W. (1992). Relational schemas and the processing of social information. 
Psychological Bulletin, 112(3), 461–484. 
Bargh, J. A. (1982). Attention and automaticity in the processing of self-relevant information. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 43(3), 425–436. 
Barthel, M., Mitchell, A., & Holcomb, J. (2016). Many Americans believe fake news is sowing 
confusion. Pew Research Center. 
Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering: A study in experimental and social psychology. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Bergman, E. T., & Roediger, H. L. (1999). Can Bartlett’s repeated reproduction experiments be 
replicated? Memory & Cognition, 27(6), 937–947. 
Bergström, A., & Belfrage, M. J. (2018). News in social media: Incidental consumption and the 
role of opinion leaders. Digital Journalism, 6(5), 583–598. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2018.1423625 
Bodenhausen, G. V., Sheppard, L. A., & Kramer, G. P. (1994). Negative affect and social 
judgement: The differential impact of anger and sadness. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 24, 45–62. 
Bodenhausen, G. V., & Wyer, R. S. (1985). Effects of stereotypes in decision making and 
information-processing strategies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48(2), 
267–282. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.48.2.267 
Brewer, W. F., & Nakamura, G. F. (1984). The nature and functions of schemas. Center for the 
Study of Reading Technical Report, 325. 
 
   
 
Brewer, W. F., & Treyens, J. C. (1981). Role of schemata in memory for places. Cognitive 
Psychology, 13(2), 207–230. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(81)90008-6 
Bronstein, M. V., Pennycook, G., Bear, A., Rand, D. G., & Cannon, T. D. (2019). Belief in fake 
news is associated with delusionality, dogmatism, religious fundamentalism, and reduced 
analytic thinking. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 8(1), 108–117. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2018.09.005 
Calvillo, D. P., Ross, B. J., Garcia, R. J. B., Smelter, T. J., & Rutchick, A. M. (2020). Political 
ideology predicts perceptions of the threat of COVID-19 (and susceptibility to fake news 
about it). Social Psychological and Personality Science, 2–10. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550620940539 
Carraro, L., Castelli, L., & Macchiella, C. (2011). The automatic conservative: Ideology-based 
attentional asymmetries in the processing of valenced information. PLoS ONE, 6(11), 
e26456. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0026456 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2020, August 25). Autism and vaccines. 
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/concerns/autism.html 
Crawford, J. T. (2012). The ideologically objectionable premise model: Predicting biased 
political judgments on the left and right. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 
48(1), 138–151. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2011.10.004 
De keersmaecker, J., & Roets, A. (2017). ‘Fake news’: Incorrect, but hard to correct. The role of 
cognitive ability on the impact of false information on social impressions. Intelligence, 
65, 107–110. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2017.10.005 
Del Vicario, M., Bessi, A., Zollo, F., Petroni, F., Scala, A., Caldarelli, G., Stanley, H. E., & 
Quattrociocchi, W. (2016). The spreading of misinformation online. Proceedings of the 
 
   
 
National Academy of Sciences, 113(3), 554–559. 
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1517441113 
DiFonzo, N., Beckstead, J. W., Stupak, N., & Walders, K. (2016). Validity judgments of rumors 
heard multiple times: The shape of the truth effect. Social Influence, 11(1), 22–39. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/15534510.2015.1137224 
Dodd, M. D., Balzer, A., Jacobs, C. M., Gruszczynski, M. W., Smith, K. B., & Hibbing, J. R. 
(2012). The political left rolls with the good and the political right confronts the bad: 
Connecting physiology and cognition to preferences. Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 367(1589), 640–649. 
https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2011.0268 
Dodd, M. D., Hibbing, J. R., & Smith, K. B. (2016). The politics of attention. In Psychology of 
Learning and Motivation (Vol. 65, pp. 277–309). Elsevier. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.plm.2016.04.003 
Duarte, J. L., Crawford, J. T., Stern, C., Haidt, J., Jussim, L., & Tetlock, P. E. (2015). Political 
diversity will improve social psychological science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 38, 
e130. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X14000430 
Dudai, Y. (2004). The neurobiology of consolidations, or, how stable is the engram? Annual 
Review of Psychology, 55(1), 51–86. 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.55.090902.142050 
Ecker, U. K. H., Lewandowsky, S., Fenton, O., & Martin, K. (2014). Do people keep believing 
because they want to? Preexisting attitudes and the continued influence of 
misinformation. Memory & Cognition, 42(2), 292–304. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-
013-0358-x 
 
   
 
Ecker, U. K. H., Lewandowsky, S., Swire, B., & Chang, D. (2011). Correcting false information 
in memory: Manipulating the strength of misinformation encoding and its retraction. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 18(3), 570–578. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-011-
0065-1 
Effron, D. A., & Raj, M. (2020). Misinformation and morality: Encountering fake-news 
headlines makes them seem less unethical to publish and share. Psychological Science, 
31(1), 75–87. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797619887896 
Fazio, L. K., Brashier, N. M., Payne, B. K., & Marsh, E. J. (2015). Knowledge does not protect 
against illusory truth. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 144(5), 993–1002. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000098 
Feldman, S., & Johnston, C. (2014). Understanding the determinants of political ideology: 
Implications of structural complexity: understanding political ideology. Political 
Psychology, 35(3), 337–358. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12055 
Ferguson, C. J., Brown, J. M., & Torres, A. V. (2018). Education or indoctrination? The 
accuracy of introductory psychology textbooks in covering controversial topics and urban 
legends about psychology. Current Psychology, 37(3), 574–582. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-016-9539-7 
Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J. C., Glick, P., & Xu, J. (2002). A model of (often mixed) stereotype 
content: Competence and warmth respectively follow from perceived status and 
competition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82(6), 878–902. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.82.6.878 
Fiske, S. T., & Neuberg, S. L. (1990). A continuum of impression formation, from category-
based to individuating processes: Influences of information and motivation on attention 
 
   
 
and interpretation. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 
(Vol. 23, pp. 1–74). Academic Press. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60317-2 
Gawronski, B. (2012). Back to the future of dissonance theory: Cognitive consistency as a core 
motive. Social Cognition, 30(6), 652–668. https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.2012.30.6.652 
Goldstein, B. E. (2014). Cognitive psychology: Connecting mind, research and everyday 
experience (4th ed.). Cengage Learning. 
Greenstein, M., & Franklin, N. (2020). Anger increases susceptibility to misinformation. 
Experimental Psychology, 67(3), 202–209. https://doi.org/10.1027/1618-3169/a000489 
Guess, A., Nyhan, B., & Reifler, J. (2018). Selective exposure to misinformation: Evidence from 
the consumption of fake news during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign. European 
Research Council, 9(3), 49. 
Hemmer, P., & Steyvers, M. (2009). A Bayesian Account of Reconstructive Memory. Topics in 
Cognitive Science, 1(1), 189–202. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-8765.2008.01010.x 
Hermida, A., Fletcher, F., Korell, D., & Logan, D. (2012). Share, like, recommend: Decoding the 
social media news consumer. Journalism Studies, 13(5–6), 815–824. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2012.664430 
Hussain, A., Ali, S., Ahmed, M., & Hussain, S. (2018). The anti-vaccination movement: A 
regression in modern medicine. Cureus, 10(7). https://doi.org/10.7759/cureus.2919 
Jardina, A., & Traugott, M. (2019). The genesis of the birther rumor: Partisanship, racial 
attitudes, and political knowledge. The Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics, 4(1), 60–
80. https://doi.org/10.1017/rep.2018.25 
Johnson, B. T., & Eagly, A. H. (1989). Effects of involvement on persuasion: A meta-analysis. 
Psychological Bulletin, 106(2), 290–314. 
 
   
 
Johnson, H. M., & Seifert, C. M. (1994). Sources of the continued influence effect: When 
misinformation in memory affects later inferences. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 20(6), 1420–1436. 
Johnson, H. M., & Seifert, C. M. (1998). Updating accounts following a correction of 
misinformation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 
24(6), 1483–1494. https://doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.24.6.1483 
Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservatism as 
motivated social cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 129(3), 339–375. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.129.3.339 
Judd, C. M., & Kulik, J. A. (1980). Schematic effects of social attitudes on information 
processing and recall. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 38(4), 569–578. 
Khanna, K., & Sood, G. (2018). Motivated responding in studies of factual learning. Political 
Behavior, 40(1), 79–101. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-017-9395-7 
Kleider, H. M., Pezdek, K., Goldinger, S. D., & Kirk, A. (2008). Schema-driven source 
misattribution errors: Remembering the expected from a witnessed event. Applied 
Cognitive Psychology, 22(1), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.1361 
Klein, D. B., & Stern, C. (2005). Professors and their politics: The policy views of social 
scientists. Critical Review, 17(3–4), 257–303. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/08913810508443640 
Luisi, M. L. R. (2021). From bad to worse II: Risk amplification of the HPV vaccine on 
Facebook. Vaccine, 39(2), 303–308. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2020.11.065 
 
   
 
Markus, H., & Zajonc, R. B. (1985). The cognitive perspective in social psychology. In G. 
Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), Handbook of Social Psychology (3rd ed., pp. 137–229). 
Random House. 
McFarland, C., Cheam, A., & Buehler, R. (2007). The perseverance effect in the debriefing 
paradigm: Replication and extension. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43(2), 
233–240. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2006.01.010 
Mikkelson, D. (2019, July 22). Is U.S. Rep. Rashida Tlaib under investigation for election fraud? 
Snopes. https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/rashida-tlaib-investigation/ 
Mitchell, A., Gottfried, J., Barthel, M., & Sumida, N. (2018). Distinguishing between factual and 
opinion statements in the news. Pew Research Center. 
Mitchell, A., Gottfried, J., Stocking, G., Walker, M., & Fedeli, S. (2019, June 5). Many 
Americans say made-up news is a critical problem that needs to be fixed. Pew Research 
Center. https://www.journalism.org/2019/06/05/many-americans-say-made-up-news-is-a-
critical-problem-that-needs-to-be-fixed/ 
Mitchell, A., Oliphant, B. J., & Klein, Hannah. (2020). Three months in, many Americans see 
exaggeration, conspiracy theories and partisanship in COVID-19 news. Pew Research 
Center. https://www.journalism.org/2020/06/29/three-months-in-many-americans-see-
exaggeration-conspiracy-theories-and-partisanship-in-covid-19-news/ 
Murphy, G., Loftus, E. F., Grady, R. H., Levine, L. J., & Greene, C. M. (2019). False memories 
for fake news during ireland’s abortion referendum. Psychological Science, 30(10), 
1449–1459. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797619864887 
 
   
 
Nyhan, B., & Reifler, J. (2010). When corrections fail: The persistence of political 
misperceptions. Political Behavior, 32(2), 303–330. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-010-
9112-2 
Pennycook, G., Cannon, T. D., & Rand, D. G. (2018). Prior exposure increases perceived 
accuracy of fake news. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 147(12), 1865–
1880. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000465 
Pennycook, G., McPhetres, J., Zhang, Y., Lu, J. G., & Rand, D. G. (2020). Fighting COVID-19 
misinformation on social media: Experimental evidence for a scalable accuracy-nudge 
intervention. Psychological Science, 31(7), 770–780. 
Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2019). Lazy, not biased: Susceptibility to partisan fake news is 
better explained by lack of reasoning than by motivated reasoning. Cognition, 188, 39–
50. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2018.06.011 
Pew Research Center. (2015, July 1). Politics and science: What americans think. Pew Research 
Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2015/07/01/americans-politics-and-science-
issues/ 
Porter, T., & Schumann, K. (2018). Intellectual humility and openness to the opposing view. Self 
and Identity, 17(2), 139–162. https://doi.org/10.1080/15298868.2017.1361861 
Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle, B. F. (1994). Social dominance orientation: A 
personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 67(4), 741–763. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.67.4.741 
Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle, B. F. (2011). Social dominance orientation 
scale. American Psychological Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/t01146-000 
 
   
 
Rapp, D. N., & Kendeou, P. (2007). Revising what readers know: Updating text representations 
during narrative comprehension. Memory & Cognition, 35(8), 2019–2032. 
https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03192934 
Roediger, H. L., & DeSoto, K. A. (2015). Reconstructive Memory, Psychology of. In 
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (pp. 50–55). Elsevier. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.51016-2 
Ross, L., Lepper, M. R., & Hubbard, M. (1975). Perseverance in self-perception and social 
perception: Biased attributional processes in the debriefing paradigm. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 32(5), 880–892. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.32.5.880 
Rothman, S., Lichter, S. R., & Nevitte, N. (2005). Politics and professional advancement among 
college faculty. The Forum, 3(1). https://doi.org/10.2202/1540-8884.1067 
Saad, L. (2010, June 25). In 2010, conservatives still outnumber moderates, liberals. Gallup. 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/141032/2010-Conservatives-Outnumber-Moderates-
Liberals.aspx 
Schul, Y., & Mazursky, D. (1990). Conditions facilitating successful discounting in consumer 
decision making. The Journal of Consumer Research, 16, 442–451. 
Seifert, C. M. (2002). The continued influence of misinformation in memory: What makes a 
correction effective? In Psychology of Learning and Motivation (Vol. 41, pp. 265–292). 
Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0079-7421(02)80009-3 
Shearer, E. (2018, December 10). Social media outpaces print newspapers in the U.S. as news 
source. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/12/10/social-
media-outpaces-print-newspapers-in-the-u-s-as-a-news-source/ 
 
   
 
Shearer, E., & Mitchell, A. (2021). News use across social media platforms in 2020. Pew 
Research Center. https://www.journalism.org/2021/01/12/news-use-across-social-media-
platforms-in-2020/ 
Shook, N. J., & Fazio, R. H. (2009). Political ideology, exploration of novel stimuli, and attitude 
formation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45(4), 995–998. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2009.04.003 
Spievak, E., Hayes-Bohanan, P., & Hermanson, J. (2020, August 6). Read this, not that: How 
students rate media sources in the age of fake news [Presentation]. New England Library 
Association 2020 Annual Conference, Online. 
Stenner, K. (2009). Three Kinds of “Conservatism.” Psychological Inquiry, 20(2–3), 142–159. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10478400903028615 
Taber, C. S., & Lodge, M. (2006). Motivated skepticism in the evaluation of political beliefs. 
American Journal of Political Science, 50(3), 755–769. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-
5907.2006.00214.x 
Tuckey, M. R., & Brewer, N. (2003). The influence of schemas, stimulus ambiguity, and 
interview schedule on eyewitness memory over time. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Applied, 9(2), 101–118. https://doi.org/10.1037/1076-898X.9.2.101 
van Prooijen, J.-W., & Krouwel, A. P. M. (2017). Extreme political beliefs predict dogmatic 
intolerance. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 8(3), 292–300. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550616671403 
Vosoughi, S., Roy, D., & Aral, S. (2018). The spread of true and false news online. Science, 
359(6380), 1146–1151. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aap9559 
 
   
 
Walter, N., Cohen, J., Holbert, R. L., & Morag, Y. (2020). Fact-checking: A meta-analysis of 
what works and for whom. Political Communication, 37(3), 350–375. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2019.1668894 
Webber, D., Babush, M., Schori-Eyal, N., Vazeou-Nieuwenhuis, A., Hettiarachchi, M., 
Bélanger, J. J., Moyano, M., Trujillo, H. M., Gunaratna, R., Kruglanski, A. W., & 
Gelfand, M. J. (2018a). The road to extremism: Field and experimental evidence that 
significance loss-induced need for closure fosters radicalization. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 114(2), 270–285. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000111 
Webber, D., Babush, M., Schori-Eyal, N., Vazeou-Nieuwenhuis, A., Hettiarachchi, M., 
Bélanger, J. J., Moyano, M., Trujillo, H. M., Gunaratna, R., Kruglanski, A. W., & 
Gelfand, M. J. (2018b). Political belief scale. American Psychological Association. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/t65993-000 
Wilson, A. E., Parker, V., & Feinberg, M. (2020). Polarization in the contemporary political and 
media landscape. Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences, 34, 223–228. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2020.07.005 
Zhu, B., Chen, C., Loftus, E. F., Lin, C., He, Q., Chen, C., Li, H., Moyzis, R. K., Lessard, J., & 
Dong, Q. (2010). Individual differences in false memory from misinformation: 
Personality characteristics and their interactions with cognitive abilities. Personality and 






   
 
Table 1 
Reliability of Measures for All Studies 
Measures Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) .88 .88 .94 
Political Belief Scale (PBS)    
Liberal .67 .62 .71 
Moderate .60 .26 .19 
Conservative .68 .65 .86 
15 aggregate ratings in Study 1 .94   
Stereotype Content Model (SCM)    
Competence  .82 .89 
Warmth  .86 .93 
Intellectual Humility (IH)  .85 .73 
Open-Mindedness  .72 .82 
Modesty  .69 .79 
Corrigibility  .78 .77 
Engagement  .67 .78 
Note. Values that are not in the table (e.g. Study 1 Competence) are due to not being used in that 




   
 
Table 2 
Study 1 Correlations of Political Beliefs and Evaluations of Target 
Measures Pre-correction Post-correction Rating change 
Liberalism       .299**       .481** .151 
Moderate -.085     .181*     .341** 
Conservatism -.120     -.360**                -.222 
Social Dominance Orientation -.114 -.020  .053 
Self-identified political leaning   -.168* -.423                -.218 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
 
   
 
Table 3 
Study 2 Correlations Between Intellectual Humility Subscales and Rating Change 
Measures Competence Warmth 
All targets 
IH Total   .167*   .159* 
IH Open-Mindedness   .157*   .169* 
IH Modesty .130 .137 
IH Corrigibility .045 .063 
IH Engagement  .172* .116 
Democrat target 
IH Total .217 .171 
IH Open-Mindedness .088 .087 
IH Modesty .168 .098 
IH Corrigibility .175 .127 
IH Engagement .229 .202 
Republican target 
IH Total           .146 .211 
IH Open-Mindedness           .061 .119 
IH Modesty           .328*     .362** 
IH Corrigibility          -.026 .083 
IH Engagement          -.006                                    -.014 
Neutral target 
IH Total .158 .125 
IH Open-Mindedness   .319*   .274* 
IH Modesty          -.078 .045 
IH Corrigibility .017                                     .038 
IH Engagement   .278*                                     .166 




   
 
Table 4 
Study 3 Means for Competence and Warmth Rating by Participant Political Party and Target 
Political Party 
Targets Pre competence Pre warmth Post competence Post warmth 
All participants 
All targets -.462 -1.303 .236 -.265 
Democrat participant 
Democrat -.430 -1.110 .417 -.020 
Republican -.970 -1.571 -.405 -.834 
Neutral -.563 -1.601 .503 -.107 
Republican participant 
Democrat .050 -.694 .091 -.571 
Republican .167 -.200 .463 .333 
Neutral .083 -1.214 .738 .184 
No party participant 
Democrat .017 -1.043 .681 .226 
Republican -.600 -1.622 -.202 -.594 




   
 
Table 5 
Study 3 Correlations Between Intellectual Humility Subscales and Rating Change  
Competence Warmth 
All targets 
IH Total .113 .157 
IH Open-Mindedness   .188*   .203* 
IH Modesty .100   .201* 
IH Corrigibility .061 .090 
IH Engagement .010 .004 
Democrat target 
IH Total   .331* .156 
IH Open-Mindedness .165                                    -.019 
IH Modesty     .386** .239 
IH Corrigibility   .265* .187 
IH Engagement .187 .064 
Republican target 
IH Total -.173   -.254* 
IH Open-Mindedness -.155   -.286* 
IH Modesty -.043 -.055 
IH Corrigibility -.083 -.139 
IH Engagement -.242   -.295* 
Neutral target 
IH Total -.079 -.056 
IH Open-Mindedness -.096 -.068 
IH Modesty -.059 -.141 
IH Corrigibility -.028   .000 
IH Engagement -.064   .043 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
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Figure 7 
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Appendix A 
How intelligent do you think this individual is? 
How efficient do you think this individual is? 
How skillful do you think this individual is? 
How friendly do you think this individual is? 
How responsible do you think this individual is? 
How competent do you think this individual is? 
How likable do you think this individual is? 
How trustworthy do you think this individual is? 
How professional do you think this individual is? 
How sincere do you think this individual is? 
How warm do you think this individual is? 
How positive do you think this individual is? 
How favorable do you think this individual is? 
How good-natured do you think this individual is? 
How well-intentioned do you think this individual is? 
  
 





of Embezzling $1.6 Million 
From Federal Government 
 
Fri, 21 Aug 2020 
 
 
Officials intend to pursue charges ' very soon' 
  
 U.S. Treasury officials announced today that they plan to pursue charges against 
Democrat House Representative Adam Schiff, 60, of California, for embezzling almost 
$1.6 million from taxpayers over a ten-year period beginning in 2010 and ending in 2020 
through a wire fraud scheme. Schiff may also be charged with money laundering, 
aggravated identity theft, and filing false income tax returns during this period. 
 
Schiff, a House Representative in California for the Democratic Party since 2001, 
allegedly opened a PayPal account using a fake name, transferred federal funds to that 
PayPal account, from that PayPal account to another PayPal account belonging to his 
 
   
 
wife, and from his wife’s PayPal account to one or more of his personal bank accounts. 
Further, Schiff allegedly concealed the embezzlement by falsifying financial entries on 
files he maintained for the federal government. 
 
Treasury officials assert that Schiff failed to pay taxes on his wealth, embezzled at least 
$854,800 and had unreported income of $231,100 in 2015, $215,100 in 2016, $83,600 
in 2017, $125,000 in 2018, $152,000 in 2019, and $48,000 in 2020.  If proven true, his 
actions created a tax loss of approximately $240,648.  
 
Officials say they plan to charge Schiff with 48 counts of wire fraud, 10 counts of money 
laundering, six counts of filing a false income tax return, and one count of aggravated 
identity theft.  Wire fraud and money laundering are punishable by up to 20 years in 
prison.  Filing a false tax return is punishable by up to three years.  Aggravated identity 
theft is punishable by a mandatory two years of prison that must follow any term 
imposed on the other counts.  Additionally, Schiff may be subject to restitution and/or 
forfeiture of money and substitute assets totaling $1,589,315.  
 
“We take offenses like embezzlement, tax fraud and money laundering very seriously,” 
an announcement published online by the U.S. Treasury read. “Schiff stole more than a 
million dollars by abusing his position handling finances for the federal government. We 
will continue to work with our law enforcement partners to protect innocent taxpayers 
from being victimized by this type of fraud.” 
 
“The role of IRS Criminal Investigation becomes even more important in embezzlement 
and fraud cases due to the complex financial transactions that can take time to unravel,” 
said a spokesperson for the IRS CI. “As we often see, federal tax laws are normally 
violated in these types of cases and IRS CI is committed to ensuring that everyone pays 
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Fri, 21 Aug 2020 
 
 
Officials intend to pursue charges ' very soon'  
  
U.S. Treasury officials announced today that they plan to pursue charges against 
Republican House Representative Jim Jordan, 56, of Ohio, for embezzling almost $1.6 
million from taxpayers over a ten-year period beginning in 2010 and ending in 2020 
through a wire fraud scheme. Jordan may also be charged with money laundering, 
aggravated identity theft, and filing false income tax returns during this period. 
 
Jordan, a House Representative in Ohio for the Republican Party since 2007, allegedly 
opened a PayPal account using a fake name, transferred federal funds to that PayPal 
account, from that PayPal account to another PayPal account belonging to his wife, and 
from his wife’s PayPal account to one or more of his personal bank accounts. Further, 
Jordan allegedly concealed the embezzlement by falsifying financial entries on files he 
maintained for the federal government. 
 
Treasury officials assert that Jordan failed to pay taxes on his wealth, embezzled at 
least $854,800 and had unreported income of $231,100 in 2015, $215,100 in 2016, 
$83,600 in 2017, $125,000 in 2018, $152,000 in 2019, and $48,000 in 2020.  If proven 
true, his actions created a tax loss of approximately $240,648.  
 
Officials say they plan to charge Jordan with 48 counts of wire fraud, 10 counts of 
money laundering, six counts of filing a false income tax return, and one count of 
aggravated identity theft.  Wire fraud and money laundering are punishable by up to 20 
years in prison.  Filing a false tax return is punishable by up to three years.  Aggravated 
identity theft is punishable by a mandatory two years of prison that must follow any term 
imposed on the other counts.  Additionally, Jordan may be subject to restitution and/or 
 
   
 
forfeiture of money and substitute assets totaling $1,589,315.  
 
“We take offenses like embezzlement, tax fraud and money laundering very seriously,” 
an announcement published online by the U.S. Treasury read. “Jordan stole more than 
a million dollars by abusing his position handling finances for the federal government. 
We will continue to work with our law enforcement partners to protect innocent 
taxpayers from being victimized by this type of fraud.” 
 
“The role of IRS Criminal Investigation becomes even more important in embezzlement 
and fraud cases due to the complex financial transactions that can take time to unravel,” 
said a spokesperson for the IRS CI. “As we often see, federal tax laws are normally 
violated in these types of cases and IRS CI is committed to ensuring that everyone pays 
their fair share.” 
 
Starbucks CEO Suspected 
of Embezzling $1.6 Million 
From Company 
 
Fri, 21 Aug 2020 
 
 
Officials intend to pursue charges ' very soon' 
  
 
   
 
FBI officials announced today that they plan to pursue charges against Starbucks CEO 
Kevin Johnson, 59, of Washington, for embezzling almost $1.6 million from the 
company over a ten-year period beginning in 2010 and ending in 2020 through a wire 
fraud scheme. Johnson may also be charged with money laundering, aggravated 
identity theft, and filing false income tax returns during this period. 
 
Johnson, president and CEO of Starbucks Coffee Company since 2017 and chief 
operating office since 2015, allegedly opened a PayPal account using a fake name, 
transferred company funds to that PayPal account, from that PayPal account to another 
PayPal account belonging to his wife, and from his wife’s PayPal account to one or 
more of his personal bank accounts. Further, Johnson allegedly concealed the 
embezzlement by falsifying financial entries on files he maintained for the company. 
 
FBI and IRS officials assert that Johnson failed to pay taxes on his wealth, embezzled 
at least $854,800 and had unreported income of $231,100 in 2015, $215,100 in 2016, 
$83,600 in 2017, $125,000 in 2018, $152,000 in 2019, and $48,000 in 2020.  If proven 
true, his actions created a tax loss of approximately $240,648.  
 
Officials say they plan to charge Johnson with 48 counts of wire fraud, 10 counts of 
money laundering, six counts of filing a false income tax return, and one count of 
aggravated identity theft.  Wire fraud and money laundering are punishable by up to 20 
years in prison.  Filing a false tax return is punishable by up to three years.  Aggravated 
identity theft is punishable by a mandatory two years of prison that must follow any term 
imposed on the other counts.  Additionally, Johnson may be subject to restitution and/or 
forfeiture of money and substitute assets totaling $1,589,315.  
 
“We take offenses like embezzlement, tax fraud and money laundering very seriously,” 
an announcement published online by the FBI read. “Johnson stole more than a million 
dollars by abusing his position handling finances for the company he works for. We will 
continue to work with our law enforcement partners to protect innocent investors from 
being victimized by this type of fraud.” 
 
“The role of IRS Criminal Investigation becomes even more important in embezzlement 
and fraud cases due to the complex financial transactions that can take time to unravel,” 
said a spokesperson for the IRS CI. “As we often see, federal tax laws are normally 
violated in these types of cases and IRS CI is committed to ensuring that everyone pays 
their fair share.” 
  
 
   
 
Appendix C 
Did Democrat House Rep 
Adam Schiff embezzle 
money from the federal 
government? 
  
Wed, 26 Aug 2020 
 
 
Recently, an article appeared on social media and has subsequently been shared many 
times, claiming that Democrat House Representative Adam Schiff engaged in 
embezzlement, wire fraud, and other crimes. This article, shared from 
worldnewsdailyreport.com, details the allegations against Schiff. The article included 
quotes from U.S. Treasury and IRS officials, which made it appear genuine at first 
glance. 
 
However, the article was researched by fact-checkers and determined to be a complete 
fabrication. The details of that article were primarily copied from an article hosted on 
Justice.gov about a bookkeeper from Philadelphia who embezzled funds from the 
company he worked for. The original article is genuine and a factual reporting of events. 
 
   
 
However, while some details, such as dollar amounts, remained untouched, most other 
details were changed. All references to the original defendant were changed to Adam 
Schiff, and other details were also changed to relate to political institutions and more 
specifically to Schiff. In other words, the article appears to be intentional misinformation 
targeting a politician. 
 
For example, in the original and factual article, it was a U.S attorney who made the 
announcement, and provided a later quote. In the altered version, the announcement 
and quote are attributed to the U.S. Treasury generally. Additionally, when the original 
article was released, the defendant had already been convicted, while the altered 
version states that Schiff will be charged. Many other details were either changed or 
removed entirely. 
 
The website that posted the article, worldnewsdailyreport.com, is a well-known purveyor 
of misinformation and hoaxes despite billing itself as “satire.” At the bottom of the 
website is the following disclaimer: "World News Daily Report assumes all responsibility 
for the satirical nature of its articles and for the fictional nature of their content. All 
characters appearing in the articles in this website – even those based on real people – 
are entirely fictional and any resemblance between them and any person, living, dead or 
undead, is purely a miracle.” While some articles simply make outrageous claims, such 
as “Death Row Inmate Eats An Entire Bible As Last Meal”, others are more political in 
nature, as demonstrated by the Adam Schiff story. 
 
No such allegations have been made against Adam Schiff. 
 
Did Republican House Rep 
Jim Jordan embezzle 
money from the federal 
government? 
 
Wed, 26 Aug 2020 
 




Recently, an article appeared on social media and has subsequently been shared many 
times, claiming that Republican House Representative Jim Jordan engaged in 
embezzlement, wire fraud, and other crimes. This article, shared from 
worldnewsdailyreport.com, details the allegations against Jordan. The article included 
quotes from U.S. Treasury and IRS officials, which made it appear genuine at first 
glance. 
  
However, the article was researched by fact-checkers and determined to be a complete 
fabrication. The details of that article were primarily copied from an article hosted on 
Justice.gov about a bookkeeper from Philadelphia who embezzled funds from the 
company he worked for. The original article is genuine and a factual reporting of events. 
However, while some details, such as dollar amounts, remained untouched, most other 
details were changed. All references to the original defendant were changed to Jim 
Jordan, and other details were also changed to relate to political institutions and more 
specifically to Jordan. In other words, the article appears to be intentional 
misinformation targeting a politician. 
  
For example, in the original and factual article, it was a U.S attorney who made the 
announcement, and provided a later quote. In the altered version, the announcement 
and quote are attributed to the U.S. Treasury generally. Additionally, when the original 
article was released, the defendant had already been convicted, while the altered 
version states that Jordan will be charged. Many other details were either changed or 
removed entirely. 
  
The website that posted the article, worldnewsdailyreport.com, is a well-known purveyor 
of misinformation and hoaxes despite billing itself as “satire.” At the bottom of the 
website is the following disclaimer: "World News Daily Report assumes all responsibility 
 
   
 
for the satirical nature of its articles and for the fictional nature of their content. All 
characters appearing in the articles in this website – even those based on real people – 
are entirely fictional and any resemblance between them and any person, living, dead or 
undead, is purely a miracle.” While some articles simply make outrageous claims, such 
as “Death Row Inmate Eats An Entire Bible As Last Meal”, others are more political in 
nature, as demonstrated by the Jim Jordan story. 
  
No such allegations have been made against Jim Jordan.  
 
Did Starbucks CEO Kevin 
Johnson embezzle money 
from the company? 
 
Wed, 26 Aug 2020 
 
 
Recently, an article appeared on social media and has subsequently been shared many 
times, claiming that Starbucks CEO and president Kevin Johnson engaged in 
embezzlement, wire fraud, and other crimes. This article, shared from 
worldnewsdailyreport.com, details the allegations against Johnson. The article included 
quotes from FBI and IRS officials, which made it appear genuine at first glance. 
 
However, the article was researched by fact-checkers and determined to be a complete 
 
   
 
fabrication. The details of that article were primarily copied from an article hosted on 
Justice.gov about a bookkeeper from Philadelphia who embezzled funds from the 
company he worked for. The original article is genuine and a factual reporting of events. 
However, while some details, such as dollar amounts, remained untouched, most other 
details were changed. All references to the original defendant were changed to Kevin 
Johnson, and other details were also changed to relate to Starbucks and more 
specifically to Johnson. In other words, the article appears to be intentional 
misinformation targeting a corporate executive. 
 
For example, in the original and factual article, it was a U.S attorney who made the 
announcement, and provided a later quote. In the altered version, the announcement 
and quote are attributed to the FBI generally. Additionally, when the original article was 
released, the defendant had already been convicted, while the altered version states 
that Johnson will be charged. Many other details were either changed or removed 
entirely. 
 
The website that posted the article, worldnewsdailyreport.com, is a well-known purveyor 
of misinformation and hoaxes despite billing itself as “satire.” At the bottom of the 
website is the following disclaimer: "World News Daily Report assumes all responsibility 
for the satirical nature of its articles and for the fictional nature of their content. All 
characters appearing in the articles in this website – even those based on real people – 
are entirely fictional and any resemblance between them and any person, living, dead or 
undead, is purely a miracle.” While some articles simply make outrageous claims, such 
as “Death Row Inmate Eats An Entire Bible As Last Meal”, others are more political in 
nature. 
 
No such allegations have been made against Kevin Johnson. 
  
